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I. INTRODUCTION
When an individual investor opens an account with a securi-
ties broker, the customer often must sign a standard-form contract
as a precondition of conducting business with the broker.1 This non-
negotiable contract, referred to as a Customer Agreement, generally
contains an arbitration clause under which the parties agree to
submit any future disputes to arbitration conducted by one of the
securities industry's self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). 2 Pro-
ceedings initiated under the broad and inclusive arbitration clause
are subject to the arbitration guidelines established by the SROs, a
group which includes all the major stock exchanges. 3 Virtually all
1. See J. KRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, ATI'ORNEYS, AND
INVESTORS 75-76 (1994); Margaret M. Harding, The Cause and Effect of the Eligibility Rule in
Securities Arbitration: The Further Aggravation of Unequal Bargaining Power, 46 DEPAUL L.
REV. 109, 117 (1996) (recognizing that investor-broker agreements are preconditions to opening
accounts); Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future
Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 185 (1996) (observing that the securities industry began to
require predispute arbitration agreements as a means of curtailing mounting litigation costs);
Margo E. . Reder, Securities Law and Arbitration: The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration
Clauses in Broker-Customer Agreements, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 91, 92 (noting that most
brokerage firms require customers to sign a standardized agreement as a precondition to trading
securities).
2. A common arbitration clause provides for arbitration of "any and al controversies which
may arise" between the broker and customer concerning the account. PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk,
81 F.3d 1193, 1196 (2d Cir. 1996). Further, it typically states that all claims are to be arbitrated
in accordance with the "rules of the organization [SRO] convening the panel." Id.; see also
GRANT, supra note 1, at 77 (providing an example of a standard arbitration provision that Shear-
son/American Express had its customers sign).
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an SRO as "any national securities ex-
change, registered securities association, or registered clearing agent, or... the Municipal Secu.
rities Rulemaking Board." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(26) (1994). The SROs include: 'The American Stock
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brokers are members of an SRO.4 The National Association of Secu-
rities Dealers ("NASD"), the leading SRO, conducts between eighty-
five and ninety percent of all customer-broker arbitrations.5
Although the parties to a securities dispute usually submit
to SRO arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement,6
some parties resist arbitration.7 The resisting party (usually the
securities broker)8 typically turns to the courts for an initial ruling
on whether the arbitration must proceed.9 Meanwhile, the party
that initially submitted its claim to arbitration (usually the cus-
tomer) tends to resist resolution of the issue by the courts, arguing
that the arbitrators themselves should decide whether arbitration
is the appropriate means of resolving the dispute.10 The question in
these cases thus becomes whether courts or arbitrators should de-
cide if a particular dispute is arbitrable. This is referred to as the
arbitrability question. In response to this threshold inquiry, the
Exchange; The Boston Stock Exchange; The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.; Cincinnati
Stock Exchange; Midwest Stock Exchange; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; The New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; New York Mercan-
tile Exchange; National Futures Association; Pacific Stock Exchange; and Philadelphia Stock
Exchange." GRANT, supra note 1, at 135. See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text for a
discussion of SROs, their self-enforcement of securities laws, and SEC oversight.
4. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 135-37.
5. Masucci, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that the NASD receives eighty-five percent of all
arbitration claims filed pursuant to SRO arbitration rules); NASD Regulation, Inc., Press Re-
lease, Aug. 5, 1999 (noting that "NASD Regulations arbitration forum is the largest securities
arbitration forum in the country, handling over 5,000 cases per year, which is approximately 90
percent of all securities arbitration cases in the United States").
6. That most parties to a dispute submit to arbitration can be seen in the number of arbi-
tration cases filed annually and those cases closed annually by the NASD arbitration forum. In
1998, for example, 4,938 cases were filed. These numbers certainly surpass the number of liti-
gated disputes. See NASD Regulation, Inc., The Neutral Corner, 11 (Nov. 1999); see also Ma-
succi, supra note 1, at 188-90.
7. See, e.g., Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, while the in-
vestor agreed to arbitration, the broker sought to enjoin the arbitral proceeding); Byb-y, 81 F.3d
at 1196 (same). For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
8. In virtually all of the cases examined in this Note, the securities brokerage firms, not
the customers, sought to avoid arbitration in favor of taking the dispute to court. See infro notes
266-72 and accompanying text.
9. See Miller, 139 F.3d at 1132; Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 94-95 (6th Cir.
1997); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir. 1995).
10. See, e.g., Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1196-97; FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1311 (8th
Cir. 1994).
11. Definitional problems arise, however, because courts construe "arbitrability" in one of
two ways. See PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that deter-
mining whether an issue is arbitrable leads one into "a definitional maze"). The first definition
of "arbitrability" refers to whether the parties intended to have an agreement to arbitrate in the
first place. Id.; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 94243 (1995)
(explaining that the initial determination must be whether the parties agreed to arbitration,
since if a party did not so agree it will normally have the right to a judicial decision on the mer-
its). The second definition of "arbitrability" concerns whether the particular dispute falls within
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Supreme Court has adopted a "clear and unmistakable" standard. 12
In two separate opinions, the Court has held that unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate the issue of arbitrabil-
ity, the question is one for courts, not arbitrators, to decide. 13 In
other words, when a question of arbitrability arises, the parties will
not be required to submit to arbitration unless there is clear and
unmistakable evidence in the arbitration agreement itself that the
parties intended to have arbitrators decide arbitrability issues. 14
This "clear and unmistakable" standard, however, is not very
clear at all. Indeed, the Supreme Court's articulation of the clear
and unmistakable standard has been extremely unclear. Because
the Court has failed to specify what contractual language satisfies
the "clear and unmistakable" requirement, lower courts have been
left to their own devices in defining the parameters of the
standard. 15 Although the lower courts almost uniformly recognize
that application of the "clear and unmistakable" standard to arbi-
trability questions is a matter of contract interpretation, they have
not reached a consensus as to which particular contract principles
should be applied in the interpretation. 16
the scope of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement to which the parties intended to be bound.
Elahi, 87 F.3d at 596; see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986). For purposes of this Note, the "arbitrability question" will refer merely to whether a
dispute is arbitrable under the agreement executed by the parties. See Norman S. Poser, Mak-
ing Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L. REv. 277, 280 (1996) (arguing "that a narrow defini-
tion of arbitrability will best accomplish the goals of arbitration, by limiting the role of the courts
so that the primary goal of arbitration-resolving disputes with the maximum degree of speed
and economy-can be accomplished"). This is essentially an umbrella definition which encom.
passes both of the above definitions. Defining "arbitrability" in this manner allows the analysis
to focus on the primary concern of this Note, namely that Rule 10324 of the NASD Code provides
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties to a securities dispute intended to arbitrate
arbitrability questions.
12. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 (holding that unless parties "clearly and unmistakably"
agree to have an arbitrator decide arbitrability issues, a court will resolve them); AT&T Techs.,
475 U.S. at 649 CUnless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.").
13. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45; AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.
14. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45; AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.
15. One court, for example, explained that the Supreme Court's standard as laid down in
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Work.
ers of America left some ambiguity. Elahi, 87 F.3d at 592. The court noted that these "Supreme
Court cases provide guidance, but do not point clearly to the correct result in this case. Conse-
quently, we embark on our own analysis." Id.
16. See Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, in
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 854
(1999) CThe 'clear and unmistakable' standard laid down in [First Options] has not ended all
confusion and disagreement among the Circuits regarding what contractual language suffices.").
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Much of the controversy surrounding the "clear and unmis-
takable" standard has focused upon the proper interpretation of the
relationship between Customer Agreements and the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure ("NASD Code" or "Code"), particularly Rule
10324.17 Briefly stated, the disagreement over Rule 10324 is
Whether its language, when adopted by the parties to a Customer
Agreement, provides clear and unmistakable evidence of an agree-
ment to submit the arbitrability question to arbitration. 18 The rele-
vant language in the Rule provides that "[a]rbitrators shall be em-
powered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provi-
sions under this Code and to take appropriate action to obtain com-
pliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s). Such interpretations
and actions to obtain compliance shall be final and binding upon
the parties."
Unfortunately, due to the Supreme Court's ambiguous ar-
ticulation of the clear and unmistakable standard and the arguably
broad language of Rule 10324, a circuit split developed, further
muddling the issue.19 Under the majority view, Rule 10324 does not
provide clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to
arbitrate arbitrability. Therefore, most courts hold that courts
should resolve this threshold issue.20 On the other side, a minority
of circuits holds that Rule 10324, when incorporated into the arbi-
17. NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, NASD
Manual, Rule 10324 (May 1999) [hereinafter NASD CODE]. Rule 10324 is the former Section 35.
In January 1996, the SEC gave the NASD permission to renumber its Code of Arbitration Proce-
dure. The renumbering itself did not substantively change the content of the various provisions.
For purposes of this Note, all NASD Code sections will be referred to by their new form for pur-
poses of clarity and simplicity. It should be noted, however, that in many of the cases discussed
in this Note the courts reference the old numbers, since those cases predate the 1996 renumber-
ing. See Sean M. Costello, Comment, Tune Limits Under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of Arbi-
tration Procedure Making Arbitrators More Like Judges or Judges More Like Arbitrators?, 52
Bus. LAW. 283, 283 n.1 (1996) (discussing the renumbering of the NASD Code).
18. See FSC Sec., Inc. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that "the par-
ties' adoption of [Rule 10324] is a 'clear and unmistakable' expression of their intent to leave the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrators"). But see Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver 108 F.3d 92,
97 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Rule 10324 is ambiguous as to who should resolve arbitrability
questions, and therefore it is not clear and unmistakable).
19. See Symposium on the Structure of Court.Connected Mediation Programs: Miller v.
Flume, 14 OIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 957, 960 (1999) (recognizing the circuit split over whether
Rule 10324 satisfies the "clear and unmistakable" standard). For a complete discussion of the
circuit split, see infra Parts lII.B.1 and IILB.2.
20. The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted Rule 10324 as not
meeting the clear and unmistakable standard, thus ruling that courts should determine ques-
tions of arbitrability. See Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1998); Sawer, 103 F.3d
at 97; Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 477 (10th Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Inc. v.
Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995).
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tration agreement, satisfies the "clear and unmistakable" standard,
thus leaving resolution of the arbitrability question to arbitrators.
21
The circuit split over whether Rule 10324 provides clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to arbitrate arbitrabil-
ity has resulted in a great deal of confusion and inconsistency re-
garding the meaning of predispute arbitration agreements in the
securities industry. The lack of uniformity leaves customers more
vulnerable to costly and prolonged court battles when their claims
could be resolved more efficiently in an arbitral forum. Therefore,
the Supreme Court should review the issue and resolve the ambi-
guity surrounding the meaning of Rule 10324 by requiring parties
to arbitrate securities disputes according to the terms of their
agreement.
This Note argues that Rule 10324, interpreted under com-
mon law contract principles and in light of the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration, satisfies the "clear and unmistakable" standard. As
a matter of contract interpretation, the entire NASD Code and the
Customer Agreements should be read as a whole contract. 22 Simi-
larly, the provisions of the Customer Agreements and the NASD
Code should be read as consistent with each other.28 Even if these
two contract principles do not resolve the question, the principle
that ambiguous contract language should be interpreted against the
drafter is dispositive of the question whether courts or arbitrators
should determine arbitrability issues.24 This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that in the vast majority of federal cases, it is the bro-
kers, not the investors, who attempt to avoid arbitration by initially
seeking judicial review of the arbitrability question.25 As the more
sophisticated and powerful parties in most securities agreements,
brokers should not be permitted to avoid the very contracts they
drafted by arguing that the contracts are ambiguous on the arbitra-
bility question. Finally, the current federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion would be eviscerated if brokers could avoid the terms of their
own contracts by tying up disputes in court.26
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of arbitration in
both general and securities arbitration cases, emphasizing the de-
21. The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that Rule 10324 proclaims that arbitrators
should decide arbitrability issues. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir.
1996); Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312-13.
22. See infra Part IV.A.1.
23. See infra Part IV.A.2.
24. See infra Part IV.A.3.
25. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IV.B.
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velopment of a federal policy in favor of arbitration as evidenced in
the Federal Arbitration Act. In addition, Part II traces the course of
the Supreme Court's gradual acceptance of the enforceability of
predispute arbitration agreements in the securities setting. This
history demonstrates the Court's fervent support for upholding par-
ties' intent as to such agreements. Part II also examines the two
Supreme Court cases that developed the "clear and unmistakable"
standard and concludes that the Court's ambiguous articulation of
this standard provided insufficient guidance to lower courts
charged with interpreting arbitration agreements. Part III explores
the nature and characteristics of securities arbitration, with par-
ticular emphasis on NASD arbitration procedures and Rule 10324
of the Code. Additionally, Part III discusses the circuit split that
developed over the interpretation of NASD Code Rule 10324 as a
result of the Supreme Court's incomplete articulation of the "clear
and unmistakable" standard. Finally, Part IV offers several reasons
why courts should side with the circuits that hold that Rule 10324
provides clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to
arbitrate the arbitrability question when those parties incorporate
the NASD Code into their agreements.
II. FEDERAL POLICY IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION AND
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING SECURITIES
ARBITRATION
A. A Brief History of Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act
Arbitration has existed as a means of resolving disputes
since ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel.27 Commercial arbitration,
with roots extending back to seventh-century England, became
permanently entrenched in the English common law system by the
fourteenth century.28 During the seventeenth century, however, ju-
dicial antipathy toward arbitration arose when judges began to fear
that arbitral bodies might usurp their jurisdiction and threaten
27. See C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES 12 (1990) (providing a
brief history of arbitration in the Anglo.American legal world); GRANT, supra note 1, at 13
(same); Anthony G. Buzbee, When Arbitrable Claims are Mxed with Nonarbitrable Ones: Thatls
a Court to Do?, 39 S. TEL. L REV. 663, 664 n.1 (1998) (discussing the history of dispute resolu-
tion in the United States).
28. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 12-13; GRANT, supra note 1, at 13.
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their salaries.29 This judicial opposition to arbitration continued
virtually unabated in England through the nineteenth century.
30
Early American courts adopted English jurists' general hos-
tility toward arbitration.31 While arbitration found its champions
in the American commercial setting, with many colonies and, sub-
sequently, states passing statutes enforcing agreements to arbitrate
existing disputes, judicial opposition to arbitration nonetheless per-
sisted.3 2 Consequently, American courts ruled predispute arbitra-
tion agreements invalid well into the twentieth century. 3 Eventu-
ally, though, lower courts began to chip away at this restrictive ap-
proach, and state legislatures soon followed suit. In 1920, for exam-
ple, the New York legislature became the first body to pass a law
validating predispute arbitration agreements.3 4 The New York
statute laid the groundwork for passage of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") in 1925.3
5
Enacted as a congressional response to the long-standing ju-
dicial distaste for arbitration,3 6 the FAA promotes arbitration by
making arbitration agreements enforceable in federal courts.3 7 Con-
gress's clear purpose in enacting the FAA was to put arbitration
agreements on the "same footing as other contracts" in order to
promote fast and efficient resolution of disputes.3 8 The FAA empow-
29. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 15-18.
30. See id. at 18-20.
31. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 20; GRANT, supra note 1, at 14.
32. See FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 23-25.
33. See id. at 23-24.
34. See id. at 24-25.
35. See id. at 25. The Federal Arbitration Act is codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994 & Supp.
1997).
36. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (noting that Congress in-
tended the FAA to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements"); Harding,
supra note 1, at 124.
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15; see also FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 38-39; Costello, supra note 17, at
291-92; Harding, supra note 1, at 124-25. The centerpiece of the FAA is § 2, which provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
The Supreme Court has subsequently described Section 2 as "a congressional declaration of a
liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
38. H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924). The House Report on the bill discussed Congress'es in-
tended revocation of judicial hostility toward arbitration, emphasized that arbitration provided a
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ers federal district courts to stay court proceedings in cases where
the relevant issue(s) may be resolved by arbitration.39 In addition
(and with direct significance for courts charged with interpreting
NASD Code Rule 10324), the FAA allows federal courts to compel
arbitration if a party to an arbitration agreement refuses to submit
to arbitration.40 Since its passage, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently acknowledged the importance of the FAA, reiterating that
the federal policy favoring arbitration requires "ambiguities as to
the scope of... arbitration [agreements to be] resolved in favor of
arbitration."41 Unfortunately, despite the relative clarity of the FAA
and the Supreme Court's recognition of the policies behind it, lower
courts have been left to grapple with some troubling residual is-
sues, such as interpretation of the scope of Rule 10324.42
B. The Supreme Court's Recognition of the Enforceability of
Predispute Arbitration Agreements
Before examining the circuit split regarding whether, in
light of Rule 10324, arbitrators or courts should determine the arbi-
trability question, it is necessary to understand the development of
the Supreme Court's recognition of predispute arbitration agree-
ments as enforceable instruments. For almost half a century, the
Supreme Court has reviewed the interaction of the FAA and securi-
ties regulation. Decided in 1953, Wilko v. Swan announced the gen-
eral policy of protecting investors from securities brokers. 43 In
Wilko, after an investor brought a claim under Section 12(2) of the
speedier and less costly form of dispute resolution than litigation, and solidified Congress's in-
tention to enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 1-2.
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; see also Moses H. Cone Afeml Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 ('Tho Arbitra-
tion Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.f).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 4; see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) ("The pre-
eminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which
parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation.").
41. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (quoting Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
42. See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 778 (observing that "two fundamental is-
sues plagued the courts" following the enactment of the FAA- "first is whether Congress, in 1925,
intended the FAA to function merely as a procedural rule, which would apply only in federal
courts, or whether Congress intended to create a new body of substantive federal law, which
would apply in both state and federal courts. The second in whether Congress intended the FAA
to include within its scope the arbitration of statutory claims").
43. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 44 the broker moved for ar-
bitration of the dispute as provided in the preexisting arbitration
agreement between the parties. 45 The Court held that protection of
the investor's substantive rights under the Securities Act required
judicial review, despite any arbitration agreement to the contrary.46
Briefly stated, the Wilko doctrine declared invalid all predispute
arbitration agreements in the securities setting.47 This restrictive
interpretation of predispute arbitration agreements continued un-
blemished for the next twenty years.
In 1974, the Supreme Court tentatively began to dismantle
the Wilko doctrine. 48 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court con-
sidered whether a dispute arising under Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") should be arbitrated
according to the terms of a predispute arbitration agreement be-
tween two international parties. 49 The Court upheld the parties'
agreement "to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their interna-
tional commercial transaction," indicating that the provisions of the
FAA required such a finding.50
The Court continued to whittle away at the Wilko doctrine in
two 1985 cases. 51 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the cus-
tomer-plaintiff alleged both state law and federal securities law
claims.52 Although the Court denied arbitration as to the federal
claims, it permitted arbitration for the pendent state claims in or-
der to uphold Congress's policy of enforcing parties' contractual
agreements to arbitrate. 5 The Court held that Congress intended
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77() (1994 & Supp. 1998). This section of the Securities Act proscribes tho
offer or sale of a security that "includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits" a neces-
sary material fact. Id.
45. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29.
46. Id. at 437-38.
47. Id.
48. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
49. Id. at 508-09.
50. Id. at 519-20. Commentators disagree as to the import of Scherk in the eventual over-
turning of the Wilko doctrine. One commentator, for example, observes that Scherk "set the stage
for enlarging the scope of issues eligible for arbitration." Costello, supra note 17, at 295. Con-
versely, a pair of authors noted that "[mI]any commentators explained Scherk as an aberration
that carved out an exception because the dispute was international in nature." Neesemann &
Nelson, supra note 16, at 785.
51. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
52. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214-15. The claims brought by the investor against the securities
brokerage firm are fairly typical. They included claims that a broker traded on the investor's
account without consent, that the transactions were excessive, and that the firm misrepresented
the status of the customers. Id. at 214.
53. Id. at 219-21.
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the pro-arbitration FAA to apply to bifurcated proceedings (i.e.,
proceedings where part of the claims are resolved in court and the
other part by arbitrators) even if its application would cause pro-
longed resolution of a securities customer's claims.54 In the same
term, the Court upheld, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, an agreement in an international contract to arbi-
trate antitrust claims, emphasizing that commercial arbitration
agreements must be enforced according to their terms. 55 Relying on
Section 2 of the FAA, the Court highlighted the mutually reinforc-
ing federal policies favoring arbitral dispute resolution on the one
hand and "enforcement of private contractual arrangements" on the
other.5
6
Only two years later, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, the Supreme Court struck another, almost fatal, blow to
Wilko. 57 The Court found nothing in the language of the Exchange
Act that precluded the use of arbitral forums for the resolution of
disputes arising under Section 10(b). 58 The McMahon Court directly
addressed Wilko, stating that in subsequent decisions the Court
found nothing in the use of arbitration that inherently impinged on
a customer's substantive rights.59 McMahon thus placed arbitra-
tion on equal footing with judicial review as a means of resolving
securities disputes.6 0 In addition, McMahon found that arbitration
supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
and by the securities industry itself through SROs, provided ade-
quate protection to investors under the Exchange Act.6' By so rul-
ing, as one commentator observed, the Court "tacitly consent[ed] to
the use of predispute arbitration clauses that incorporated by refer-
ence SRO arbitration rules."62
The Wilko wall finally crumbled in 1989 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez de Ouijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc.63 Rodriguez explicitly overruled Wilko, holding that Se-
54. Id. at 218-21. Justice White even more clearly pointed toward the eventual overruling
of the Wilko doctrine. In his concurring opinion, White noted that whether claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not arbitrable is an issue of serious doubt. Id. at 224
(White, J., concurring).
55. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
56. Id. at 625.
57. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
58. Id. at 230-32.
59. Id. at 231-32.
60. Id. at 232.
61. Id. at 233-34.
62. Costello, supra note 17, at 295; see also MeMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.37.
63. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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curities Act Section 12(2) claims could be subject to arbitration. 4
The Court read the Securities Act and the Exchange Act "harmoni-
ously," as part of an integrated system of federal securities regula-
tion.65 The Court finally had abandoned the retrogressive approach
of disfavoring the enforcement of predispute arbitration agree-
ments. 66 Rodriguez mandated that courts enforce predispute arbi-
tration agreements for all claims arising under federal securities
laws.67
The line of cases culminating in Rodriguez reveals a steady
trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward favoring arbitration
in the securities setting.68 By 1990, the Supreme Court had finally
aligned itself with the congressionally mandated policy favoring
arbitration, as embodied in the FAA.69 This trend in jurisprudence
bolsters the argument that arbitrators should determine questions
of arbitrability. Taking such issues out of the hands of arbitrators
would supplant current legislative and judicial policy, rendering
arbitration weaker and making predispute arbitration agreements
less certain. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he fact that par-
ties who signed an agreement to arbitrate future disputes find
themselves forced to litigate collateral issues [such as arbitrability]
tends to defeat the unique advantages of arbitration."70
64. Id. at 484.
65. Id. at 484-85.
66. Id. at 484.
67. Id. at 484-85; see also GRANT, supra note 1, at 122; Costello, supra note 17, at 296.
68. The Supreme Court also has advocated the policy that favors arbitration in cases in-
volving labor arbitration. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not preclude arbitration under the
FAA, especially if the parties agree to arbitration). In fact, the federal policy in favor of arbitra-
tion pervades all fields of arbitration. See generally, Special Project, Current Issues in Arbitra-
tion, 51 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1998) (offering scintillating and illuminating Notes on various as-
pects of arbitration in the Nation's leading law review).
69. In addition the Supreme Court has reiterated its support for the pro-arbitration policy.
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) ('The [Fed-
eral] Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.").
70. Poser, supra note 11, at 279. For a discussion on how and why dealers seek to avoid ar-
bitration, see infra Part IV.A.3.
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C. Developing a Standard for Determining Arbitrability
1. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, the Supreme Court established the standard currently
used to determine whether courts or arbitrators should decide if
disputes are arbitrable under the terms of predispute arbitration
agreements between investors and securities brokers.71 In this case,
AT&T and the union had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement. Article 8 of the agreement provided that "differences
arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the per-
formance of any obligation hereunder" must be arbitrated. 2 Mean-
while, Article 9 excluded from arbitration AT&T's decisions con-
cerning management functions, including the hiring and termina-
tion of employees. 73 Article 20 prescribed the order in which work-
ers were to be laid off, if necessary, due to a lack of work.74 A dis-
pute arose when AT&T laid off 79 workers, allegedly in contraven-
tion of other articles of the collective bargaining agreement.7 5 AT&T
refused to submit the union's claim to arbitration, arguing that,
because the dismissal of workers fell under Article 9, the dispute
was not subject to arbitration. 6 In opposition, the union claimed,
pursuant to Article 20, that a layoff required a work shortage.77 In
its suit to compel arbitration, the union argued that whether the
layoffs were justified by a lack of work was a question for the arbi-
trator to decide, not the court.78
71. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986). AT&T Technolo-
gies concerns the issue of arbitrability in the labor context. Some commentators suggest that
labor arbitration cases should be distinguished from commercial arbitration cases because of the
different jurisprudence and due to the fact that labor arbitration is not governed by the FAA.
See Natasha Wyss, Comment First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L REV. 351, 362 (1997). At least one court, however, has noted
that "there is little question" that court decisions regarding labor arbitration apply to commercial
arbitration. PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 594 n.6 (1st Cir. 1996). The court observed
that the fact that First Options, a commercial arbitration case, relied on AT&T Technologies, a
labor arbitration case, should put all doubt to rest. Id.
72. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 645.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 645-46.





The federal district court found that since the union's inter-
pretation was at least plausible, it was "for the arbitrator, not the
court[,] to decide whether the union's interpretation has merit."7 9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that courts generally
decide the issue of arbitrability. 80 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit
found an exception to the general rule, explaining that arbitrators
should resolve the issue of arbitrability if the parties clearly have
not excluded arbitrability from the arbitration agreement, if the
agreement contains a standard arbitration clause, and if, in decid-
ing the arbitrability question themselves, the courts would become
embroiled in interpreting the substantive provisions of the agree-
ment.81
The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's exception
to the general rule.8 2 The Court held that interpretation of the arbi-
trability provisions of collective bargaining agreements is a function
of the courts.8 3 The Court based its decision on four main
principles.84 First, arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party
who did not agree to arbitration cannot be bound to arbitrate. 85
Second (and most importantly for purposes of this Note), the Court
held that "the question of arbitrability . . . is undeniably an issue
for judicial determination."86 The Court stated that "[u]nless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the
court, not the arbitrator."87 The Court did not elaborate on what
language would suffice to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable"
standard. 88 It can be inferred from the facts of AT&T Technologies,
however, that Articles 8, 9, and 20 of the collective bargaining
agreement, read together, did not constitute the requisite clear and
unmistakable language. The third principle announced by the
Court was that a court cannot rule on the potential merits of the
79. Id.
80. Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. Id.
82. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 651.
83. Id. at 649.
84. Id. at 648-50. The Court based its presentation of the four principles on the Steelwork.
ers trilogy of cases. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
85. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 648-49.
86. Id. at 649.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 649-52.
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underlying claim when it reviews the arbitrability issue.8 9 Fourth,
"where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a pre-
sumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the
particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscepti-
ble to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."90
Under AT&T Technologies, then, an arbitrator will decide
whether an issue is arbitrable only if the agreement reveals the
parties' clear and unmistakable intent to submit the issue to arbi-
tration.91 Otherwise the court will decide the arbitrability issue.
2
The problem with the AT&T Technologies decision is that it fails to
specify what language will satisfy the "clear and unmistakable"
standard.93 This ambiguity ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and resulted in
the circuit split over Rule 10324 of the NASD Code.4
2. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
In First Options, the Supreme Court confirmed the standard
for determining the arbitrability question in the context of predis-
pute securities arbitration agreements.95 Adhering to the precedent
established in AT&T Technologies, the Court held that "[c]ourts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is 'clear[ ] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did
S0."96
In First Options, the defendant First Options of Chicago,
Inc., a securities firm, sought arbitration to resolve a dispute with
MK Investments, Inc. ("MKI'), Mr. Kaplan, who owned IMKI, and
Mrs. Kaplan.97 MKI submitted to arbitration, as required under the
89. Id. at 649.
90. Id. at 650 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960)).
91. Id. at 649.
92. Id.
93. It must be noted, however, that AT&T Technologies stands for the proposition that par-
ties may agree to arbitrate arbitrability. Id. at 649.
94. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
95. Id. at 944 (establishing the "clear and unmistakable" standard for use in interpreting
arbitration agreements in the securities setting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 940. It is important to observe here that it was the securities firm that sought to
compel arbitration. This is in contrast to most of the other cases explored in this Note, in which
the customerslinvestors seek arbitration and the securities firms attempt to avoid arbitration.
This distinction and its importance in evaluating First Options vis.&.vis the NASD Rule 10324
cases is explored below. See infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
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terms of a Loan Agreement, which contained an arbitration
clause. 98 The Kaplans, however, had not signed the Loan Agree-
ment; instead, they had signed a Letter Agreement that did not
contain an arbitration clause. 99 The Kaplans contended, therefore,
that their dispute with First Options was not subject to mandatory
arbitration. 100
The arbitration panel rejected the Kaplan's argument and
imposed its jurisdiction.101 Upon reviewing the merits of the claims,
the arbitral panel ruled against the Kaplans, compelling them to
appeal the decision to the federal district court. 102 The district court
upheld the arbitral panel's decision, explaining that it was plausi-
ble for the arbitrator to have concluded that the Letter Agreement
was intended to incorporate by reference the Loan Agreement. 10 3
Under this reasoning, the Kaplans had in fact expressly submitted
the dispute to arbitration.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding
that the dispute between First Options and the Kaplans was not
arbitrable. 0 4 The court explained laconically that questions of arbi-
trability are for courts to decide. 0 5
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling. 106
The Court narrowed the relevant question to this: Who has the
power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, the court
or the arbitrator?10 7 In response to this question, the Court first
recognized that "arbitration is simply a matter of contract between
the parties."08 If the parties agreed to submit the question of arbi-
trability to arbitration itself, then courts should "give considerable
leeway to the arbitrator," setting aside the arbitrator's decision on
the merits only in the narrowest circumstances. 109 If, however, it is
unclear whether the parties agreed to submit the question of arbi-
98. Id. at 940-41. The arbitration clause in the loan agreement stated: "Any controversy be.
tween First Options and MKI arising out of MKrs business or ... this... Agreement... shall bo
submitted to and settled by arbitration . Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d
1503, 1507 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994).
99. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940-41.




104. Id. (citing Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1509 (3d Cir. 1994)).
105. Id. (citing Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1509).
106. Id. at 947.
107. Id. at 943.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Section 10 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994)).
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trability to arbitration itself, then the courts should independently
decide this issue.110 In reviewing the parties' agreement, the Court
held that state contract law governs the interpretation of the con-
tract."1
The threshold consideration, once again, was that "[c]ourts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability
unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did
so."112 The Court stated that "[i]n this manner the law treats silence
or ambiguity about the question 'who (primarily) should decide ar-
bitrability' differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity
about the question 'whether a particular merits-related dispute is
arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement'-for in respect to this latter question the law reverses
the presumption." 113 This conflrms the Court's conclusion that, in
general, courts should resolve the question of arbitrability, absent a
clear and unmistakable agreement to the contrary. Thus, courts
should defer to the presumption in favor of arbitration only in those
situations where the scope and breadth of the arbitration agree-
ment-and not the agreement to arbitrate itself-are at issue.114
As in AT&T Technologies, however, the First Options Court
failed to explain what constitutes clear and unmistakable
evidence. 115 Instead, one is left to draw inferences from the Court's
application of the general standard to the specific facts of the case.
The Court noted that the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement
could not bind the Kaplans (since they did not sign it) even though
they did sign the Letter Agreement and both documents were exe-
cuted as part of one Workout Agreement.116 The Court found no
other clear and unmistakable evidence that the Kaplans had agreed
to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. 117
110. Id. The internal inconsistency, indeed the circularity, of this reasoning should be clear.
It tells little about how the court or arbitrator should decide if the parties agreed.
111. Although contract law certainly differs in the particulars, this Note will not evaluate
certain state contract law. Most courts spend little, if any time, discussing the nuances of state
contract law when dealing with questions about arbitrability of securities disputes. This may be
because the principles are generally broad and similar among the states. Sce infra Part IVA for
a discussion of general contract principles as applied to the interpretation of Rule 10324.
112. Id. at 944.
113. Id. at 944-45.
114. Once an agreement to arbitrate is clearly shown by the evidence, an arbitrator can de-
cide the scope of arbitration. Id.
115. Id. at 944-46; see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643
(1986).




Ultimately, the Supreme Court provided little guidance to
lower courts charged with determining the exact parameters of the
"clear and unmistakable" standard.118 This problem was exacer-
bated by the fact that the arbitration agreements in AT&T Tech-
nologies and First Options differed from the standard Customer
Agreements used by securities brokers, which incorporate the
NASD Code.11 9 In AT&T Technologies, the arbitration agreement
was part of a collective bargaining contract that expressly limited
the arbitrability of a particular type of claim. 120 In First Options,
the customers did not sign the arbitration agreement, which was
part of a larger Workout Agreement that deviated significantly
from the standard-form Customer Agreement used by most securi-
ties brokerage firms. 121 Therefore, it is doubtful whether the analy-
sis in these two cases should even be applied in disputes where the
interpretation of a typical Customer Agreement is at issue. This
uncertainty, and the inherent ambiguity of the clear and unmistak-
able standard itself, are nowhere more evident than in cases inter-
preting the scope of Rule 10324 of the NASD Code.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION, RULE
10324 OF THE NASD CODE, AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Securities Arbitration and the Predominance of the NASD
Arbitral Forum
Before discussing the circuit split over the interpretation of
NASD Code Rule 10324, it is necessary to explore the structure of
securities arbitration itself. A predispute arbitration agreement
generally provides investors with the option of two or more SRO
forums and dictates that the procedural rules of the SRO will gov-
ern the agreement and any subsequent arbitration proceedings. 122
The choice for investors is of little consequence, however, since the
procedural rules of the SRO arbitral forums are virtually
identical. 123 The similarity derives from the fact that all SROs have
118. See Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 16, at 854 (recognizing the "confusion and dis.
agreement among the Circuits regarding what contractual language suffices").
119. See supra note 2 (discussing the typical Customer Agreement).
120. AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 644-45.
121. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940-41.
122. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 81-82 (providing a copy of a securities firm Client Agree.
ment, which contains an arbitration provision); Harding, supra note 1, at 119.
123. See Costello, supra note 17, at 285-86; Masucci, supra note 1, at 187.
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adopted the Uniform Code of Arbitration ('UCA ), with approval of
the SEC.12 4
In an effort to encourage SROs to refine both arbitration
procedures and the rules governing predispute arbitration agree-
ments, the SEC initiated a movement to create a uniform process
for the resolution of small claims by investors.10 Spurred by the
SEC, the securities industry established, in 1977, the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"), consisting of both
members of the general public and representatives of the SROs. 126
In 1984, the SICA presented the industry with the UCA, which all
SROs, including the NASD, adopted with only minor alterations. 127
Although the arbitration procedures of the SROs provide for arbi-
tration upon demand of the investor,128 the rules do not require
member-brokers to have their investors sign predispute arbitration
agreements. 129 Although they are not mandatory, most brokers
demand that their retail customers sign such agreements. 30 It is
important to note that these agreements often incorporate, by ref-
erence, the arbitration rules of one or more of the SROs, usually the
NASD Code.131 Consequently, most retail investors are compelled to
arbitrate.
As one commentator observed: "[t]he growing importance of
arbitration in the securities markets cannot be overemphasized." 13 2
Likewise, the dominance of the NASD in conducting securities arbi-
124. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 143 (discussing the UCA and its adoption by the SRO3).
125. See Costello, supra note 17, at 285; Masucci, supra note 1, at 186.
126. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM, URB. LJ. 483
(1996) (providing a comprehensive history of the SICA).
127. Masucci, supra note 1, at 187.
128. See NASD CODE, Rule 10301. Rule 10301(a) provides:
Any dispute, claim, or controversy eligible for submission under the Rule 10100
Series between a customer and a member and/or associated person arising in
connection with the business of such member or in connection with the activi-
ties of such associated persons shall be arbitrated under this Code, as provided
by any duly executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of
the customer.
Id.
129. See Costello, supra note 17, at 285-86; see generally NASD CODE.
130. See Costello, supra note 17, at 285-86 (discussing how most securities dealers require
investors to sign agreements as a precondition to opening an account).
131. See, e.g., PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1996) (providing a portion
of the arbitration agreement at issue in the case, which stated that "[a]ny arbitration shall be in
accordance with the rules in effect of either the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., American Stock
Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc .... ); see also GRANT, supra note
1, at 82 (including a copy of a securities broker's arbitration agreement).
132. Costello, supra note 17, at 285 n.8.
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tration must be acknowledged. 183 Although most securities trading
within the dealer-investor relationship occurs without
controversy, 34 the number of claims filed with the NASD has in-
creased steadily in the past two decades. 135 Resolution of these
claims has proceeded apace, and the NASD arbitration process has
proven itself a fast and efficient means of dispute resolution. 86
Much of the activity within the NASD arbitral forum derives,
perhaps, from a sense of customer confidence in the process. 3 7 This
may be due in large part to the continual refining of the NASD
Code in response to changes in the market, recommendations by the
SEC, SICA, and the American Arbitration Association, and propos-
als initiated by internal monitoring. 38
133. See Masucci, supra note 1, at 188 (noting that the NASD arbitration forum hears be-
tween eighty-five and ninety percent of all securities arbitration in the United States). NASD
Regulation, Inc., a subsidiary of NASD, Inc., provides the largest arbitration forum in the United
States. NASD Regulation, Inc., oversees all securities brokers and brokerage firms with public
customers. See NASD Regulation, Inc., Press Release, Aug. 5, 1999.
134. In 1994, the NASDAQ Stock Market alone reported an annual share volume of trading
of 74.4 billion. In the same year, 5,570 new arbitration claims were filed under the NASD Code.
For a claim to be fied under the NASD Code, the trading may take place through any SRO.
Indeed, the only requirement is that the dealer be a NASD member. Therefore, the total annual
volume in all United States securities markets shows that the 5,570 claims filed are relatively
small, and that most trading occurs without dispute. See Masucci, supra note 1, at 188.
135. Claims filed under the NASD Code reached an all-time high in 1995, with 6,058 filings.
The number fell to 5,631 in 1996, and to 4,938 in 1998. The number of NASD arbitration cases
closed annually has followed a similar pattern, reaching a peak in 1996, with 6,331 closings,
compared to 5,484 in 1998. The decrease in filings does not represent a decrease in the impor-
tance of NASD arbitration, for it continues to garner close to ninety percent of all claim filings in
the securities industry. The decrease in filings may be explained by an increased emphasis by
NASD in mediation, and due to investor satisfaction in the current bull market. See GRANT,
supra note 1, at 95-96; Masucci, supra note 1, at 188; George H. Friedman, Securities Arbitra.
tion: Still Effective as the Millennium Dawns, 10 WORLD ARBITRAITON & MEDIATION REPORT 134
(May 1999); NASD Regulation, Inc., The Neutral Corner, 11 (Nov. 1999).
136. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 101-04. That NASD arbitration is at least efficient can be
seen in 1994 statistics. In that year, when the NASD closed 4,561, "[tlhe average length of time
it took a case to close in 1994 was 10.4 months with the average hearing lasting 2.5 days." Ma-
succi, supra note 1, at 188. This is considerably shorter than the average time for resolution in
courts. See id. at 189-90; see also Anthony DeToro, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration of
Investor-Broker Disputes, 21 CtrMB. L. REV. 615, 618-19 (1990-1991) (noting that courts favor
arbitration because it provides a speedy alternative to litigation, lowers the cost to the parties,
and relieves crowded court dockets).
137. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 105. But see Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Un-
conscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U. L. REV. 255, 325 (1998) (arguing that manda-
tory securities arbitration "strips... customers of procedural and substantive rights").
138. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 143; Harding, supra note 1, at 115 n.28 (explaining how the
SEC oversees SROs activities, and how SROs are responsible for policing their own rules and
enforcing securities laws). The NASD appointed former SEC Chairman David Ruder to lead a
task force to study several issues concerning securities arbitration. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., SECURITIES REFORM, REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK
FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
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Rule 10324 embodies the self-executing nature of the NASD
Code. It states that "the arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret
and determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code
and to take appropriate action to obtain compliance with any ruling
by the arbitrator(s). Such interpretations and actions to obtain
compliance shall be final and binding upon the parties."139 Despite
this clear affirmation by the NASD of the authority of arbitrators to
decide all issues that fall within the scope of the Code, and al-
though most customer agreements expressly incorporate the NASD
Code, broker-members routinely seek preliminary determination of
arbitrability issues by the courts.140
B. Circuit Conflict over Rule 10324
1. Avoiding the Presumption of Arbitration-Circuits that Rule in
Favor of Courts Deciding Arbitration
Four circuits, the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh, have
held that NASD Rule 10324 does not provide the kind of clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent required by the Su-
preme Court in AT&T Technologies and First Options.14 1
Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. pres-
ents a set of facts typical of many of the cases examining the scope
of Rule 10324.142 Cogswell, the plaintiff, opened an account with the
defendant-broker, which required Cogswell to sign a standard-form,
non-negotiable agreement. 143 Like virtually all arbitration provi-
sions used by other securities brokers, the clause here stated that
Cogswell "agreed that any controversy arising out of her business or
this Agreement shall be submitted to arbitration conducted ac-
INC. (1996); see also Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the
Hard Questions, 33 HousL.1 REV. 327 (1996) (providing a detailed analysis of the Ruder Report).
139. NASD CODE, Rule 10324.
140. See, eg., Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1997); PaineWebber
Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1196 (2d Cir. 1996); see also infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing how bro-
kers seek to avoid arbitration).
141. See Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1998); Sarver, 108 F.3d at 97; Cog-
swell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 480 (10th Cir. 1996); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995); Edward D.
Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. See Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 475; see also Sarver, 108 F.3d at 93-94; Cohen, 62 F.3d at 382.
For a discussion of a slightly different fact pattern, see the discussion of Miller v. Flume, infra
text accompanying notes 169-82.
143. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 475. For a discussion of standard customer agreements issued by
securities brokers, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
2001] 611
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
cording to the rules and procedures of... the ... NASD." 44 In ad-
dition, the agreement incorporated, by reference, the NASD Code.145
Following the purchase of certain investments, their value
declined significantly. This compelled Cogswell to file a NASD arbi-
tration proceeding against Merrill Lynch on the grounds that the
investments were of too high a risk and could not be liquidated for
several years. 146 As in almost all cases that turn on the scope of
Rule 10324, it was the securities broker, not the customer, who
then sought an order from the court to enjoin arbitration.147
Merrrill Lynch argued that the dispute was ineligible for arbitra-
tion pursuant to the time-bar provision outlined in Rule 10304 of
the NASD Code, which bars arbitration of claims "where six (6)
years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the
act or dispute, claim or controversy."148 In resolving the question
whether a court or arbitrator should determine if a claim is time
barred under Rule 10304, the Cogswell court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that Rule 10324 permits the arbitrator to determine this
threshold issue.149 The court held that Rule 10324 does not consti-
tute a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to
have arbitrators decide whether they have jurisdiction over a cus-
tomer's claim. 150 The court explained that Rule 10324 does not spe-
cifically state whether a court or arbitrator should determine the
ambit of Rule 10304.151 Relying on contract analysis, the court
stated that specific provisions like Rule 10304 prevail over general
provisions such as Rule 10324.152 Thus, the court dismissed the ar-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 478 (noting that both the customer and the broker agreed that the arbitration
agreement incorporated the NASD Code).
146. Id. at 475.
147. Id. For a discussion of the importance of how it is usually the securities brokers, not the
claimant/customer, who seek to avoid arbitration, see infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
148. Id. Rule 10304 (former Section 15) provides:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event
giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy. The Rule shall not ex-
tend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is
directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.
NASD CODE, Rule 10304. An examination of the time-bar issue under Rule 10304 is beyond
the scope of this Note. For a careful analysis of Rule 10304, see Costello, supra note 17, at 296-
98.
149. Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 480.
150. Id. at 481.
151. Id. at 479-80.
152. Id. C' The ordinary rule in respect to the construction of contracts is this: that where
there are two clauses in any respect conflicting, that which is specifically directed to a particular
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gument that the NASD Code should be read as a whole, holding in-
stead that the Code should be treated as a series of loosely con-
nected but independent provisions, to be read individually.
The Cogswell court again construed the NASD Code as a se-
ries of fragmented, independent provisions in its examination of
Rule 10101.153 A general provision like Rule 10324, Rule 10101 pro-
vides that in a dispute between a broker and a customer, once the
obligation to arbitrate arises, the provisions of the Code apply to
that arbitration.154 The plaintiff argued that this provision, read in
light of Rules 10324 and 10304, provides clear and unmistakable
evidence of the parties' intent to submit all disputes to
arbitration.155 The court disagreed for three reasons.'5 6 First, Rules
10101 and 10304 concern different issues, and therefore neither
prevails over the other. 157 Second, "even if [Rule 10101 and Rule
10304] conflicted, [Rule 10304] would control because it is specific
rather than general."158 Third, like Rule 10324, Rule 10101 is not
the type of clear and unmistakable language required under the
Supreme Court's First Options standard. 15 9
The contract analysis line of reasoning in Cogswell closely
resembles that of the other circuits that have ruled that Rule 10324
does not provide clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties in-
tent to permit arbitrators to determine issues of arbitrability.16 For
example, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, at best, Rule
10324 creates an ambiguity as to who should resolve questions of
arbitrability. 161 Such ambiguity is not the kind of "clear and unmis-
takable" evidence required under First Options.162 The Cohen court
construed Rule 10304 to mean that a customer-broker dispute is
matter controls in respect thereto over one which is general in its terms.' ") (quoting Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 558 (1904)).
153. Id. at 481.
154. Id. at 481. Rule 10101 (former Section 1) provides, in relevant part: "This Code of Arbi-
tration Procedure is prescribed and adopted... for the arbitration of any dispute, claim, or con-
troversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association....f
NASD CODE, Rule 10101.




159. Id. The Cogswell court, however, did not discuss what type of language the First Op-
tions Court required to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard. Id.
160. See, e.g., Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 96-98 (6th Cir. 1997); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383-84 (11th Cir. 1995).
161. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 383-84.
162. Id. As in Cogswell, the Cohen court did not define what kind of language the First Op-
tions Court required. Id.
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eligible for arbitration only if it is submitted within six years of the
event that caused the dispute. 163 This substantive prerequisite to
arbitration is a specific provision of the NASD Code, whereas Rule
10324 is a general provision. 164 As in Cogswell, the Cohen court con-
cluded that specific contract clauses take precedence over general
provisions. 65 Consequently, the court held that Rule 10324 does not
provide the kind of clear and unmistakable evidence envisioned by
the First Options Court.
166
In Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, the Sixth Circuit closely ad-
hered to the reasoning in Cohen.167 The Sarver court quoted not
only the substance of the Cohen court's analysis of Rule 10324, but
also the entire analysis of Rule 10101 from the Cogswell opinion. 168
Therefore, Sarver provides little additional insight into the appro-
priate interpretation of the NASD Code and Rule 10324.
The most recent articulation of this side of the circuit split
appears in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Miller v. Flume.169 The
facts are somewhat different from those of Sarver, Cogswell, and
Cohen, however. 170 The Flumes, customers of a brokerage firm, filed
an arbitration grievance with the NASD, to which the firm initially
submitted.171 The NASD arbitration panel found for the Flumes,
awarding them $150,000 in damages and almost $30,000 in costs. 7 2
The firm appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the firm
transferred all its assets to its parent company. 73 In response, the
Flumes began a second arbitration proceeding. 174 This time the se-
curities firm sought to avoid arbitration by filing in federal district
court. 175 Finding for the brokerage firm, the district court ruled that
Rule 10324 was not clear and unmistakable language sufficient to
have a NASD arbitrator determine whether the dispute should be
arbitrated. 176 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals offered a rela-
tively brief discussion of the scope of Rule 10324 before ruling that
163. Id. at 384.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995).
167. Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 96-98 (6th Cir. 1997).
168. Id. at 97-98.
169. Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1998).
170. Id. at 1131-32.
171. Id. at 1131.




176. Id. at 1133.
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it "is not the kind of clear and unmistakable language that First
Options requires."177 The Miller court acknowledged the current
circuit split and, curiously, noted that the Supreme Court has
adopted a "hospitable approach" to arbitration. 178 Nonetheless, the
Seventh Circuit followed the interpretation of Rule 10324 it had set
out previously, in Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells.17 9 Here, the
court had concluded, "we do not believe that this provision is a clear
and unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to have the arbi-
trators, and not the court, determine which dispute the parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration."180 The Miller court only
slightly expanded on the Sorrells explanation of Rule 10324, tersely
stating that the provision "says nothing about arbitrability."18 1 The
court suggested that Rule 10324 could be read to mean that arbitra-
tors decide arbitrability issues, but that the language is not suffi-
ciently clear and unmistakable to satisfy the First Options stan-
dard.18 2 Thus, Miller, like Sarver, added nothing to the Cogswell
and Cohen interpretations of Rule 10324, aside from support for the
holdings.
Ultimately, the majority view relies primarily on the
vaguely defined and perhaps misplaced contract principle that spe-
cific provisions prevail over general ones.18 Moreover, the major-
ity's narrow, formalistic approach to the NASD Code neglects the
well-established federal policy, as evidenced in the FAA, that re-
solves ambiguous arbitration agreements in favor of arbitration. 18
Even less convincingly, these four circuits state that Rule 10324
does not provide the language required by First Options. This ar-
gument necessarily fails because First Options itself did not define
177. Id. at 1134.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992).
180. Sorrells, 957 F.2d at 514 n.6. Although the Seventh Circuit decided the Sorrells case in
1992, three years before First Options, the Sorrells court based its interpretation of Rule 10324
on AT&T Technologies. Since the Miller court presented its discussion of First Options as merely
an affirmation of its Sorrells decision, it makes no difference to this discussion that Sorrells was
decided earlier than First Options. The oft-quoted statement in Sorrells interpreting Rule 10324




183. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the three common law contract principles the Supreme
Court used to interpret the scope of a Customer Agreement).
184. See supra Part l1.A (discussing the federal policy that favors arbitration as evidenced in
the FAA).
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the exact language that would satisfy the "clear and unmistakable"
standard, and these cases offer even less guidance.
185
2. Reading "Clear and Unmistakable" Broadly: Circuits that Rule in
Favor of Arbitrators Deciding Arbitrability
Only two circuit courts, the Second and Eighth, 186 have held
that Rule 10324 permits arbitrators to resolve arbitrability ques-
tions; however, several federal district courts, and a number of
state courts, have ruled that arbitration agreements themselves
provide the necessary clear and unmistakable language. 187 These
opinions tend to present a more detailed, careful analysis of Rule
10324 and its relationship to Customer Agreements and the rest of
the NASD Code. As a result, they are generally more convincing
than the opinions espousing the majority view.
Perhaps the most widely cited circuit court opinion reflecting
the minority view is FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel.188 The securities
broker, a member of the NASD, had Freel, the customer, sign a
predispute arbitration agreement according to the industry stan-
dard. 8 9 After the Freels submitted an arbitration claim to the
NASD, the broker moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 10304,
arguing that the claim was time barred because the Freels failed to
file a claim within six years of establishing their brokerage
185. See supra Part II.C.2 (examining the ambiguity left by the First Options Court regard.
ing the "clear and unmistakable" standard).
186. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel,
14 F.3d 1310, 1313.14 (8th Cir. 1994).
187. See Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a standard securities industry customer agreement, which provides for the arbitration of "any
controversy," satisfies the clear and unmistakable standard); First Montauk Sec. Corp. v.
Menter, 26 F. Supp. 2d 688, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the Uniform Submission Agree.
ment signed after the customer filed a claim with the NASD evinces a clear and unmistakable
intent to arbitrate arbitrability); Singer v. Smith Barney Shearson, 926 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (holding that a contract provision, which stated that "any controversy" between the
customer and the broker will be arbitrated, meets the clear and unmistakable language) Smith
Barney Shearson v. Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39, 46-47 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that both the arbitration
agreement itself and Rule 10324 of the NASD Code clearly and unmistakably evidence the par-
ties' intent to arbitrate all issues, including arbitrability questions).
188. Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Freel for the proposition that
Rule 10324 alone satisfies that parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate questions of
arbitrability); see also Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 96 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) (same);
Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 475-76 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same); Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1202 (same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62
F.3d 381, 383 (11th Cir. 1995) (same).
189. Freel, 14 F.3d at 1311.
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account.19 0 The district court found for the Freels, citing Rules
10101 and 10324 as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties'
intent to have arbitrators decide whether the Freels' claim was time
barred. 191
The circuit court, explicitly rejecting the holding in Sorrells,
concluded that Rule 10324 is clear and unmistakable evidence of
the parties' intent to present all arbitrability issues to an arbitra-
tor.19 2 The court reasoned that since the predispute arbitration
agreement incorporated the entire NASD Code, Rule 10324 must be
considered when resolving the arbitrability question.193 Rule 10324,
the court observed, clearly submits to arbitrators the interpretation
of all sections of the NASD Code.194 Reading the NASD Code "as a
whole," the Freel court held that "by adopting the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure as the rules governing their dispute, [the se-
curities firm] agreed to give the arbitrators discretion via [Rule
10324] of that Code to interpret [Rule 10304's] time limitation."195
In PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the Freel holding and expanded upon its con-
tract analysis.196 The Bybyk facts follow the general pattern.
19
Upon opening an investment account with PaineWebber, the By-
byks signed the compulsory predispute arbitration agreement as
part of the larger client agreement. 98 The agreement stated in part
that "any and all controversies" arising between the Bybyks and
PaineWebber were to be resolved through arbitration. 99 Addition-
ally, the agreement provided that any customer claims were to be
arbitrated under the rules of the governing SRO.200 Alleging breach
190. Id.; see supra note 148 for the text of Rule 10304.
191. Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1312-13.
194. Id. at 1313 'In no uncertain terms, [Rule 10324] commits interpretation of all provi-
sions of the NASD Code to the arbitrators.").
195. Id.
196. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 199G); see also Harding, supra
note 1, at 157 (noting that the Freel "courts reliance on [Rule 10324] is sound" because Rule
10324, which is "applicable to all the provisions of the Code, fills in that silence by unambigu-
ously giving the arbitrators the power to interpret and determine the applicability of [Rule
10304]-).
197. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1195-96. For an example of the general fact patterns in cases involv-
ing the interpretation of Rule 10324, see the discussion of Cogswell supra notes 142-48 and ac-
companying text.
198. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1196. The Bybyk opinion excerpted a large portion of the agreement.
Id. at 1197. This demonstrates the court's approach of construing contract language in the con-
text of the entire agreement. Id. at 1197, 1199-1200.




of fiduciary duty and failure to monitor their account, the Bybyk's
filed a claim against PaineWebber with the NASD.201 As often oc-
curs, the securities broker, PaineWebber, sought to enjoin the arbi-
tration proceedings under the time bar provision in Rule 10304.202
The Second Circuit's detailed analysis began with the prem-
ise that a determination of whether to arbitrate arbitrability de-
pends on whether or not the parties agreed to do s0.203 The court
noted that this, in essence, is a contractual matter which must be
resolved under the applicable state contract law.20 4 The court also
recognized the FAA's policy favoring arbitration in cases of ambi-
guity.20 5 Citing First Options, however, the court acknowledged that
if an arbitration agreement is ambiguous as to whether a claim is
even eligible for arbitration, a court must decide that issue.206 Thus,
where ambiguity exists with regard to whether a claim in fact
arises under the arbitration agreement, a court will resolve the
question unless the agreement clearly and unmistakably expresses
the parties intent to arbitrate arbitrability. 207
The Bybyk court further noted that where ambiguity exists
as to contract language, it should be construed against the party
who drafted the contract.208 This common law principle applies even
in the context of predispute arbitration agreements. 20 9 Here,
PaineWebber drafted the agreement, making it a nonnegotiable
prerequisite for retaining the firm as an investment broker; ac-
cordingly, any ambiguous contract language should be construed
against it.210
With these principles of contract interpretation in mind,
the Bybyk court closely examined the language and structure of the
relevant agreement. 211 The court interpreted the provision "any and
201. Id. at 1195.
202. Id. at 1195-96; see also Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d
474, 475 (10th Cir. 1996) (Merrill Lynch petitioned the court "for an order permanently staying
arbitration," after the customer submitted a claim to NASD arbitration); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir. 1995) (Merrill Lynch sought to avoid
arbitration on grounds that the customer's claim was time-barred).
203. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1198.
204. Id.
205. Id. For a discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act and its policy favoring arbitration,
see supra Part II.A.
206. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1198.
207. Id. at 1198-99 (citing First Options and AT&T Technologies.).
208. Id. at 1199 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63
(1995)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1195, 1199.
211. Id. at 1199-1200.
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all controversies .. shall be determined to arbitration," to be "in-
clusive, categorical, unconditional and unlimited" language-a clear
expression of the parties' intent to submit arbitrability questions to
arbitration.212 By reading the agreement inclusively, the court con-
cluded that the Bybyks and PaineWebber had agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability questions. 213
The Bybyk court departed from the approach of other courts
in determining whether predispute arbitration agreements drafted
by securities brokerage firms incorporate by reference the NASD
Code.214 Although it concluded that the NASD Code was not incor-
porated into the agreement between PaineWebber and the Bybyks,
the court stated that even if the Code had been incorporated, Rule
10324 would resolve the arbitrability question in favor of arbitra-
tion.215 The court quoted the Freel opinion at length, observing that
Rule 10324 "grants to the arbitrators the power to interpret and
apply" Rule 10304.216 Unlike the Cogswell, Cohen, and Sarver
courts, the Bybyk court implied that Rule 10324 prevails over Rule
10304 in cases of apparent contradiction.2 17 Consequently, the court
stated, "[t]he language of the Code itself commits all issues, in-
cluding issues of arbitrability and timeliness, to the arbitrators."
21
In Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Sacharow, the Court of
Appeals of New York closely followed the reasoning of both Freel
and Bybyk.219 Notably, the Sacharow court added two significant
policy justifications for its holding that the parties' agreement and
Rule 10324, construed together, clearly and unmistakably provided
212. Id. at 1199.
213. Id. at 1200.
214. Id. at 1201. Paine Webber argued that the agreement provision which stated that "arbi-
tration shall be governed by the rules of the organization convening the paner effectively incor-
porated by reference the entire NASD Code. Id. at 1200-01. The court, however, disagreed,
ruling instead that since the agreement did not specifically call for arbitration only under the
NASD Code, that Code was not incorporated by reference. Id. at 1201. In most cases discussed
in this Note concerning the interpretation of Rule 10324, the courts do not discuss this issue.
See, e.g., Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 475 (10th Cir.
1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir. 1995).
It appears that in many of these cases both parties either submit to the NASD Code expressly in
the agreement or leave the choice up to the customer filing the complaint. See FSC Sec. Corp. v.
Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1994); Cogs well, 78 F.3d at 475. In each case, the NASD Code
is incorporated by reference into the agreement, as is standard industry practice. See GRANT,
supra note 1 at 137.




219. Smith Barney Shearson v. Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39,46-47 (N.Y. 1997).
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for arbitration of arbitrability questions. 220 First, the court ex-
plained that its holding bolstered the long-standing federal and
New York policies favoring arbitration as a cheaper and more effi-
cient means of dispute resolution. 221 In reviewing questions of arbi-
trability, therefore, courts should approach predispute arbitration
agreements cautiously, considering them carefully before finding
them invalid.222 Second, the Sacharow court recognized the typical
procedural postures of securities firms following the filing of a cus-
tomer's claim with the NASD.223 Since the brokerage firms draft the
arbitration agreements and require their customers to sign them,
courts should not allow the same firms to avoid these agreements
when it appears advantageous for them to do so. 224 As the court
noted, brokerage firms "should not garner that strategic advantage
against their aggrieved or dissatisfied customers. '225
Even without reference to the NASD Code, some courts have
found the requisite clear and unmistakable language in the Cus-
tomer Agreement itself.226 For example, in Smith Barney Shearson,
Inc. v. Boone, the Fifth Circuit held that the "broad language" of the
predispute arbitration agreement presented clear and unmistakable
evidence of the parties' intent to have "any controversy" decided by
an arbitrator.227 This included the resolution of arbitrability ques-
tions, such as those concerning counterclaims by dealers that the
customer's claim was time barred.228
Two federal district court cases closely followed the Boone
approach.229 Noting that arbitration agreements are merely con-
tracts, the court in Singer v. Smith Barney Shearson applied gen-
220. Id. at 49-50.
221. Id.




226. See, e.g., Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1995); First
Montauk Sec. Corp. v. Menter, 26 F. Supp. 2d 688, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Singer v. Smith Barney
Shearson, 926 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
227. Boone, 47 F.3d at 754. The issue in Boone was whether a court or arbitrator should do-
cide if the customer's claim is time-barred under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code or the corre-
sponding rule in the American Stock Exchange Code, Rule 605. Id. at 752. The Boone court
partially based its conclusion on the reasoning that such timeliness issues are procedural ques-
tions, which the Supreme Court has decided are for arbitrators, not courts, to decide. Id. at 753
(citing John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)). This reasoning assisted the court
in ruling that it need not look beyond the terms of the agreement between the parties. Id. at
754. Thus, the Boone decision is a forceful judicial expression of the primacy of the language of
the predispute arbitration agreement in determining questions of arbitrability.
228. Id.
229. See First Montauk, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 689; Singer, 926 F. Supp. at 187.
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eral contract principles in interpreting a predispute arbitration
agreement. 230 The Singer court held that the language of the
agreement itself evinced a clear and unmistakable intent by the
parties to resolve all disputes through arbitration.2 1 The court in
First Montauk Securities Corp. v. Menter took the same approach,
holding that a Uniform Submission Agreement signed by the secu-
rities firm upon being joined as a defendant in a customer's class
action suit satisfied the "clear and unmistakable" standard.
2
Considered together, the cases explicating the minority view
provide a preferable interpretation of the "clear and unmistakable"
standard as applied to Rule 10324. Focusing on the intent of the
parties, the courts in the minority read the Customer Agreement
and the entire NASD Code as one contract. Consequently, they have
held that the broad and overarching language of Rule 10324 clearly
and unmistakably indicates that parties to such agreements intend
to arbitrate arbitrability. Any other ruling would allow brokers to
avoid the very contracts they require their customers to sign.
Moreover, this approach upholds the well-established policy in fa-
vor of arbitration.
233
IV. ADVOCATING ARBITRATION: TOWARD A MORE PRECISE
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ARBITRABILITY
The preceding discussion highlights the need for a more pre-
cise definition of the "clear and unmistakable" standard currently
used to determine arbitrability in the securities context. Without
such clarification, uncertainty and a lack of uniformity may under-
cut investor confidence in securities markets.2
4
230. Singer, 926 F. Supp. at 187. The predispute arbitration agreement in this case mirrored
the industry standard agreement. Id. It provided that "[a]ny controversy arising out of or re-
lating to... this agreement" will be subject to arbitration. Id.
231. Id. Curiously, this court cited AT&T Technologies, not First Options, for the "clear and
unmistakable" standard, even though the present case was decided in 1996, one year after First
Options. Id.
232. First Montauk, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 689. A Uniform Submission Agreement is a form used
by the parties submitting a dispute to arbitration. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 219. The agree-
ment designates which SRO will govern the arbitration, and incorporates the arbitration rules of
that SRO. See id. The agreement states the claim, facts, and remedies sought See id. For a
copy of a standard Uniform Submission Agreement, see id. at 220.
233. See supra Part H.A (discussing the federal policy favoring arbitration).
234. See Costello, supra note 17, at 297 (noting that the circuit split over NASD Code Rule
10304 "breeds confusion among customers and increases the cost of transactions for all parties").
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A. Reading Securities Arbitration Agreements and the NASD Code
Broadly-A Contract Interpretation
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the arbi-
trability question is a matter of contract interpretation.235 Of
course, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate any issues it has not
agreed to submit to arbitration.236 Basic rules of contract interpre-
tation support the proposition that predispute arbitration agree-
ments satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" standard and thus per-
mit arbitrators, not courts, to evaluate questions of arbitrability. 237
One commentator has even suggested that the First Options Court
itself "had a definite end in mind: placing great importance on the
agreement of the parties, so as to protect and promote contractual
freedom in the arbitral setting."2 38 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Leh-
man Hutton, Inc., a Supreme Court opinion issued in the same term
as First Options, provides guidance on how to proceed with a con-
tractual analysis of predispute arbitration agreements.23 9
The issue in Mastrobuono was whether an arbitrator's award
was consistent with the intent of the parties to an arbitration
agreement. 240 Significantly, the case turned on the interpretation of
a typical Customer Agreement issued by a securities firm and
signed by an individual customer.241 Like virtually all the other
agreements discussed in this Note, the agreement here stated that
"any controversy" arising from the customer-broker relationship
235. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (not-
ing that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitra-
tion any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit').
236. See id. at 648-49.
237. One court has observed that "[a] cardinal principle of federal arbitration law is that 'ar-
bitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 594 (1st
Cir. 1996) (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 648).
238. Wyss, supra note 71, at 362.
239. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59-63 (1995). Many courts
have cast their examinations of arbitration agreements in terms of contract interpretation. See,
e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (in re.
viewing an arbitration agreement, "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control,
but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability"); McCarthy v. Azure,
22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute
under the terms of the agreement "is ordinarily a function of the parties' intent as expressed in
the language of the contract documents"); Singer v. Smith Barney Shearson, 926 F. Supp. 183,
187 (S.D. Fla. 1996) C(It must be borne in mind that arbitration agreements are no more than
contracts to which the usual rules of contract interpretation apply.").
240. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 53-54.
241. Id. at 58 n.2. For a discussion of standard-form Customer Agreements issued by securi-
ties brokers, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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"shall be settled by arbitration."242 In addition, the agreement in-
corporated by reference the NASD Code.2A3 The Mastrobuono Court
interpreted the Customer Agreement in light of three established
common law principles of contract interpretation: first, Customer
Agreements and the incorporated NASD Code should be construed
as a single writing and therefore should be interpreted as a whole;
second, all the documents comprising the single agreement should
be considered to be consistent with each other; third, ambiguous
language should be construed against the drafting party.2 " These
three principles suggest an integrated approach to interpreting
Customer Agreements; together they provide support for the argu-
ment that arbitrators should determine whether customer claims
are arbitrable.
1. Customer Agreements and Rule 10324 Should Be Interpreted as
Part of the Same Contract
The first contract principle advanced by the Mastrobuono
Court is that the provisions of the Customer Agreement, including
Rule 10324, should be read as a whole. 4 5 That is, the Court con-
strued the arbitration provision and the NASD Code as part of the
same overall agreement.2 6 This approach comports with Section
202(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states that
"[a] writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part
of the same transaction are interpreted together."247 Accordingly,
provisions in standard-form Customer Agreements used by securi-
ties brokers should be read in accordance not only with other provi-
sions in the same agreement, but also with the NASD Code when-
ever it is incorporated by reference.
This approach supports the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Freel and the Second Circuit's decision in Bybyk. 248 These courts
read the Customer Agreements broadly, concluding that they satis-
fied the "clear and unmistakable" standard.249 Conversely, the
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 59, 62-63.
245. Id. at 59 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(2) as support for construing to-
gether the meaning of two provisions in the Client Agreement); see also Harding, supra note 1, at
166 C"Ambiguous terms in contracts are construed against the interests of the party who drafted
them.").
246. Id. at 59-60.
247. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(2) (1981).
248. See supra Part U.B.2.
249. See supra notes 186-218 and accompanying text.
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whole interpretation principle, outlined in Section 202(2) of the Re-
statement and reaffirmed by Mastrobuono, undermines the ap-
proach taken in Miller, Sarver, Cogswell, Cohen, and Sorrells.
2 0
Considered under the whole interpretation principle, Rule
10324 governs with respect to other provisions of the NASD Code.
For example, if, in response to a customer's claim filed with the
NASD arbitral forum, a broker counterclaims that the customer's
claim is time-barred under Rule 10304, then Rule 10324 mandates
that an arbitrator decide whether the claim is indeed time-
barred.251 While Rule 10304 is silent as to who should determine
whether a claim is time-barred,252 it expressly states that arbitra-
tors have the power to determine the applicability of all sections of
the Code.253 Therefore, if the Code is read as a whole, Rule 10324
clearly and unmistakably provides that arbitrators are to resolve
all disputes arising out of the broker-customer relationship. 2 4 This
conclusion is supported by the fact that most Customer Agreements
incorporate the NASD Code and state that any dispute will be re-
solved by an NASD arbitrator in accordance with the Code.
2. Contract Provisions Should Be Construed as Consistent with
Each Other
The second, and closely related, common law contract princi-
ple adopted by the Mastrobuono Court is "that a document should
be read to give effect to all its provisions and to render them consis-
tent with each other."255 This principle is embodied in Sections
202(5) and 203(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.256 For
example, Section 202(5) states that "[w]herever reasonable, the
250. For a discussion of these five cases, see supra Part III.B.1.
251. For a discussion of Rule 10304, see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
252. Rule 10304 states only that a time-barred claim is not eligible for submission to NASD
arbitration. NASD CODE, Rule 10304.
253. See id. Rule 10324.
254. See Harding, supra note 1, at 157 ("[Rule 10304] is silent as to who shall make the de-
termination as to eligibility. [Rule 10324], applicable to all the provisions of the Code, fills in
that silence by unambiguously giving the arbitrators the power to interpret and determine the
applicability of [Rule 10304].").
255. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995).
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(5), 203(a) (1981). Section 203(a) states
that "an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is




manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement
are interpreted as consistent with each other."27
This principle contradicts one of the central arguments used
by the Sarver, Cogswell, and Cohen courts.28 In finding that nei-
ther the provisions of the NASD Code nor the Customer Agree-
ments met the "clear and unmistakable" standard, these courts re-
lied heavily on the premise that specific provisions such as Rule
10304 prevailed over general ones such as Rule 10324.2 9 This ap-
proach directly contradicts both the Restatement and Mastrobuono;
therefore, it should not survive as controlling precedent. Further-
more, in light of Restatement Section 202(5), it is fair to assert that
a predispute arbitration agreement and the provisions of the incor-
porated NASD Code should be read as mutually consistent and not
contradictory. In this light, it is at least arguable that Rule 10324
dictates that all disputes be determined by arbitration.
3. Ambiguous Contractual Language Should Be Interpreted Against
the Drafter
Even if the preceding two contract principles do not dispose
of a securities broker's argument that courts should ultimately de-
cide arbitrability issues, the third principle enunciated by the Mas-
trobuono Court should resolve the question in favor of the Freel-
Bybyk approach. The Mastrobuono Court stated that "a court
should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the
party that drafted it."260 This rule protects the party that did not
draft the contract from unfair and unintended results. 261 The Court
cited Section 206 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for this
proposition. 262 The Official Comment to Section 206 explains that
the drafter of any agreement is likely to include language favoring
its own position; the drafter is also in a better position to know of
ambiguities and thus to guard against them.26 Indeed, as one court
has observed, "the drafters of these agreements include the invest-
257. Id. § 202(5).
258. See discussion supra Part HI.B.1.
259. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
260. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62.
261. Id.
262. Id. Section 206 provides: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the
party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds? RESATEENr
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206.
263. Id. § 206, cmt. a, quoted in Afastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63 n.10.
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ment houses through their customarily uniform industry standards
and forms, and they can adequately protect their interests with
specificity of inclusion and exclusion.
264
Under this third contract principle, whenever a broker in-
duces a customer to sign a predispute arbitration agreement and
later seeks to enjoin arbitration in favor of judicial resolution of the
dispute, any alleged ambiguities in the agreement should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration. This principle likewise can be applied
to the NASD Code and Rule 10324. Although the brokers certainly
did not draft the Code, they are in a position much more akin to a
drafter than are customers. Where brokers incorporate the Code
into Customer Agreement, they presumably understand the terms
and scope of the Code much better than the average customer. Con-
sequently, the principle that ambiguous agreements should be con-
strued against the drafter weakens the typical argument by brokers
that the question of arbitrability should be left to courts due to am-
biguity in either the Customer Agreement or the NASD Code.
The contract principle favoring non-drafters is especially
valid with respect to the circuit split cases. Without exception, all
the circuit court cases discussed above involved situations where
the securities brokerage firm, not the customer, sought to enjoin
arbitration in favor of a judicial resolution.265 This refutes the tradi-
tional assumption that brokers prefer arbitration to litigation. 266
That brokers would want to avoid the very agreements they drafted
and required their customers to sign may at first appear paradoxi-
264. Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39, 46 (N.Y. 1997).
265. See Miller v. Flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver,
108 F.3d 92, 93 (6th Cir. 1997); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1195 (2d Cir. 1996);
Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 475 (10th Cir. 1996);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 382 (11th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec.
Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1994).
266. See GRANT, supra note 1, at 105 ("Brokers prefer arbitration as clearly expedient and
less expensive than trial by jury and other litigation."); Davis, supra note 137, at 324 C'Securities
firms want all claims against them arbitrated to benefit from the efficiency of the process."). Cf.
id. (noting that investors too might prefer arbitration as a fast and efficient means of dispute
resolution). Some critics of predispute arbitration agreements between individuals and organi-
zations erroneously conflate employer-employee arbitration contracts with broker.customer
agreements. See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
(Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1072-73 (1998). In so
analogizing these disparate arrangements, critics assume that the individuals uniformly seek to
avoid arbitration, while the organizations or corporations attempt to force arbitration. See Spoi-
del, supra at 1072-74. Although these arrangements share some similarities, such as the fact
that they are nonnegotiable, the presumption that individuals always seek judicial resolution
does not hold true for the securities setting.
626 [Vol. 54:2:591
"CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE"
cal. Certain commentators, however, have offered convincing expla-
nations as to why brokers prefer to resolve disputes in court.
One observer, for example, has suggested that firms distrust
the SRO arbitration process due to what they perceive as "the inde-
pendence of arbitrators from strict compliance with legal rules,
from supervision by a trial court, and from review by an appellate
court [all of which lead to] a 'runaway' panel [that] may unduly fa-
vor a claimant."267 Another commentator has agreed, observing that
arbitrators are permitted to resolve disputes by reference to equita-
ble principles, whereas a court must strictly abide by the technical
requirements of a particular rule. 268 Therefore, "[tihe unrelenting
attempts by the securities firms to get the eligibility issue before
the court is ... a transparent attempt to control the ultimate out-
come of the issue."269 Yet another reason that securities brokers
might want to resolve disputes in court is that, by doing so, they
might deplete investors' resources. 270 If brokers can successfully get
a case tied up in the court system, an investor with limited finan-
cial resocurces may be forced to either settle or withdraw the claim
altogether in order to avoid the costs of a prolonged dispute.271 In-
deed, given the particular advantages brokers seek to gain through
judicial resolution of their disputes with customers, construing
ambiguities against the drafters, and in favor of arbitration, may be
necessary in order to protect investors' interests.27 -
The strength of the Mastrobuono contract analysis is that it
aids in discerning the parties' intent. Taken together, the three
267. Poser, supra note 11, at 289.
268. See Harding, supra note 1, at 147 n.263.
269. Id. A Florida District Court of Appeals expounded on this explanation. It observed
that:
For its own purposes, Dean Witter chose to draft customer agreements requir-
ing customers to submit to arbitration "any controversy." It is not surprising
that, in circumstances like those presented in this case, Dean Witter would pre-
fer the procedural and substantive advantages of a judicial forum for the
prompt and dispassionate application of such legal defenses as the statute of
limitations. But Dean Witter elected a different, nonjudicial forum for resolu-
tion of "any controversy" with its customers. Having provided for arbitration in
its customer agreement, Dean Witter will have to trust the arbitrators to do
their jobs properly.
Id., (quoting Victor v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 606 So.2d 681, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992)).
270. See Poser, supra note 11, at 295.
271. See id.
272. See supra Part III.B.2. The Sacharow court observed that "it would be ironic and
anomalous to permit parties from the securities industry, who generally derive benefits from the
arbitration method they impose on their thousands of customers, to elude the comprehensive
language of their own industry-drafted arbitration agreements." Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v.
Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39, 50 (N.Y. 1997).
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common law contract principles outlined in Mastrobuono provide
clear and unmistakable evidence that parties to Customer Agree-
ments intend to have arbitrators decide questions of arbitrability.
Finally, contract analysis arguably supports the conclusion
that the language of the Customer Agreement itself satisfies the
"clear and unmistakable" standard; thus, resorting to a considera-
tion of Rule 10324 may be wholly unnecessary. Such an analysis
closely follows the reasoning of the court in Boone, but it adds a
stronger contract justification for the conclusion.273 One court, for
example, interpreted a Customer Agreement providing that "any
and all controversies which may arise between [the parties] con-
cerning any account, transaction, dispute or the construction, per-
formance or breach of this or any other agreement ... shall be de-
termined by an arbitrator"274 as indicating that the parties intended
to arbitrate all matters.2 75 Under this interpretation, the only way a
dispute could be heard first by a court is if the agreement expressly
excluded the particular type of claim from arbitration. 276
B. Promoting the Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
Permitting arbitrators to resolve arbitrability questions
promotes the federal policy favoring arbitration. 277 As the Supreme
Court has noted, "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with
a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."278 Both
the FAA and several Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed the
general policy that courts should "rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate ."279
273. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
274. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 197 (D. Mass. 1995).
275. See id.; see also Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that "any controversies" language is sufficiently broad to require arbitration of all
arbitrability questions).
276. See Landay, 903 F. Supp. at 197.
277. See supra Part II.A (discussing the federal policy in favor of arbitration that originated
with the passage of the FAA in 1925).
278. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
279. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see Volt Info. Scis., Inc, v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (noting that "due regard
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the
arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration"); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
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At the heart of this federal policy lies the maxim that arbi-
tration is a fast and efficient means of dispute resolution. M As
court dockets swell with a growing mass of litigation, arbitration is
an increasingly viable, perhaps even vital, alternative. This is espe-
cially true of arbitration proceedings conducted by SROs because
they offer heavily regulated and well-organized forums for dispute
resolution.281 As the Supreme Court has stated: "Contracts to arbi-
trate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the con-
tract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged
litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbi-
tration, sought to eliminate." 2 If courts permitted brokers to avoid
arbitration, the firmly entrenched policy favoring arbitration would
be compromised.
V. CONCLUSION
Thoughtful contract analysis amply supports the conclusion
that Rule 10324 clearly and unmistakably provides evidence of the
parties' intent to submit all controversies arising out of securities
agreements to arbitration. Contrary rulings, such as those handed
down by the majority of circuits, eviscerate the well-established
federal policy in favor of arbitration. These majority opinions have
incorrectly interpreted and applied the Supreme Court's decisions
in First Options and AT&T Technologies concerning the "clear and
unmistakable" standard. They have failed to recognize the impor-
tant differences between the arbitration agreements examined in
those cases and the Customer Agreements analyzed in cases deter-
mining the scope of Rule 10324. Even if these reasons for resolving
the circuit split in favor of the Freel-Bybyk model were not enough,
the consequences of reaching a contrary resolution should put any
doubt to rest.
Even if adherence to contract principles and the federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration alone do not conclusively support resolving
the circuit split in favor to the Freel-Bybyk model, an examination
280. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (upholding
"the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by
the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts).
281. See Poser, supra note 11, at 286 & n.61 (discussing how the SEC has power to oversee
all activities of SROs); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994) (Exchange Act) (codifying the SEC's over-
sight power); Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the
New Rules Can Investors'Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1205 (1990) (ar-
guing that SRO and SEC rule changes better protect investors and help to effectuate a fast, fair,
and efficient arbitration process).
282. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984).
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of the consequences of following the Cogswell-Cohen model man-
dates such a resolution. Under the Cogswell-Cohen model, securi-
ties brokers can continue to evade the very arbitration agreements
they impose upon their customers by seeking judicial resolution of
disputes. Permitting brokers to act in this manner creates investor
uncertainty concerning the vitality of their claims against brokers;
this uncertainty, in turn, may have odious ramifications in the se-
curities markets. Adoption of the Freel-Bybyk model is necessary in
order to combat this uncertainty, thereby protecting both the vi-
ability of the securities markets and the rights of individual inves-
tors.
Guy Nelson*
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